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Antitrust Analysis of Supermarket Retailing: 
 
Common Global Concerns that Play Out in Local Markets 
 
ABSTRACT 
  This paper reviews the basic antitrust standards for the supermarket industry including 
definition of product and geographic markets and the exercise of coordinated and unilateral 
market power.  It surveys the structure-conduct-performance and the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization literature to highlight alternative tests for supermarket power.  The focus is a 
supermarket chain’s ability to exercise buyer as well as seller power.  Recent research on vertical 
pricing topics including noncompetitive pricing games, double marginalization, private labels, 
vertical foreclosure, vertical price leadership and price transmission expand the analysis to 
market channel pricing issues.  The availability of comprehensive scanner data, new economic 
theory and extensive computing power now allows one to estimate food manufacturer and 
supermarket retailer pricing conduct in the wholesale market jointly with retailer conduct in the 
consumer market.   
Keywords:     market definition, market power, Nash Bertrand conduct, manufacturer Stackelberg 
conduct, price cost margin, market concentration, price transmission rate 
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Supermarkets are truly a global phenomena.  Moreover, food systems seem to be 
converging, towards a hybrid of U.S. and European practices (Cotterill 1997).  European 
researchers predict that as few as three or four truly global multinational supermarket companies, 
e.g., Carrefour, Royal Ahold, and Wal-Mart, will serve as channel captains for the distribution of 
food to consumers worldwide (e.g. Wrigley et al., 2005).  Whether or not this degree of 
consolidation occurs remains an open question.  Either way one has an increasing need to 
analyze supermarket performance, especially their impact on market channels, and other 
stakeholders including food manufacturers, consumers and farmers. 
This is a common global concern that plays out in local markets.  There is considerable 
research on the Australian situation.  Griffith (2004) and Australian Parliament (1999) review 
supermarket performance and discuss policy options.  Rather than “carry coal to Newcastle,” this 
paper reports on similar research in the U.S. and U.K but will discuss Australian research when it 
illustrates points in the general argument.   
The paper is organized as follows.  First up is horizontal market power.  Important 
subtopics include product and geographic market definition, market structure, and the 
measurement of unilateral and coordinated market power in local supermarket oligopolies.
1  
Then the focus is on vertical relationships in the market channel including double 
marginalization, the introduction of private label products, countervailing and coalescing power, 
and vertical market foreclosure, including the exercise of buyer power by supermarkets.  Finally 
comes the need to recognize the impact of noncompetitive market channels on price transmission 
when analyzing changes in agricultural policies and mergers.   
                                                 
1 A more comprehensive review would include research on barriers to entry (Cotterill and Haller 1992) and the 
effect of financial leverage on product market competition (Chevalier 1995).   3
II.  Measurement of Horizontal Market Power in the Supermarket Industry:   
The Australian Competition Commission defines market power as … 
“the ability of a firm to behave persistently in a manner different from the 
behavior that a competitive market would enforce on a corporation facing 
otherwise similar cost and demand conditions.” [ACCC, 1999]. 
 
Market power is an issue in horizontal and vertical merger policy in nearly all countries.  
Mergers that tend to substantially lessen competition, i.e., increase the exercise of market power, 
are often prohibited.  (FTC 1997, US DOJ 1984, EU 2004, ACCC 1999).  Monopolization and 
anti-competitive pricing practices, including outright price fixing, are other areas of concern.   
IIa.  Market Definition and Concentration in Relevant Antitrust Markets 
  The relevant market for measurement of horizontal market power has two dimensions:  
product and geographic.  The U.S. Federal Merger Guidelines find a set of products or a 
geographic area to be an antitrust market if a hypothetical monopolist who controls all commerce 
in the set can elevate price by a small but significant nontransitory amount in a profitable 
fashion.  (FTC, 1997, p. 6). 
  Since 1979 the F.T.C. has maintained that supermarket sales is the relevant market for 
supermarkets, not some broader category of food purchases.  Today, the supermarket sales 
product market definition includes the supermarket component of hypermarkets such as a Wal-
Mart supercenter, but it does not include sales from wholesale or club stores such as Sam’s, 
Costco, or BJ’s, or limited assortment stores such as Aldi.  The U.K. Competition Commission 
has confirmed a similar product market definition process and result for analysis of market 
power questions in UK the supermarket industry.  “We conclude that the market is for one-stop 
grocery shopping carried out in stores of 1,400 square meters (about 15,000 square feet) or 
more.”  (UK Competition Commission, 2000, p. 2).   4
In Australia the Parliament’s 1999 study of food retailing “Fair Market or Market 
Failure” took no position on the relevant product market but noted that it had a strong influence 
on the position of the nation’s top three chains.  The Woolworths, Coles, and Franklin 
supermarket chains captured only 43% of “total take home food and liquor” (Joint Select 
Committee, p. 41).  The Australian Bureau of Statistics used census data to find that the top three 
supermarkets had 75.4% of the grocery market (includes smaller stores and convenience stores) 
in 1997-98.  Neither of these conforms to current U.S. or UK product market definition for 
supermarkets.  In 2005 with the demise of the third ranked chain, Franklins, the top two, Coles 
and Woolworths, account for over 75% of grocery sales and an even higher share of supermarket 
sales in Australia.   
Geographic markets for the sale of supermarket products are inherently local, not 
regional or national.  Most consumers frequent supermarkets within a few miles of their home.  
“One stop shopping patterns are primarily local with consumers rarely traveling more than 10 
minutes in urban areas and rarely more than 15 minutes elsewhere to do their main weekly 
shopping.”  (UK Competition Commission, 2000, p. 2).  Store trading areas, however, overlap in 
urban areas.  Geographical barriers such as rivers, demographic barriers such as racially 
segmented urban neighborhoods, and the population density in urban areas are features that 
define antitrust geographic markets that are larger than individual store trading areas but smaller 
than large metropolitan areas.  In Australia supermarket concentration in many local geographic 
markets is even higher than national concentration (see JSC p. 14 chart).
2 
                                                 
2 One important qualification to this market definition exercise is clearly recognized by antitrust authorities in the 
U.S. and Europe.  An antitrust market may be narrower if price discrimination is possible (e.g. FTC, 1987, p. 7).   5
IIb.  Competitive Effects Analysis 
    Only recently have European and Anglo-American analysis of market power effects in 
noncompetitive markets converged to a common framework. Traditionally, Anglo-American 
analysis focused upon what is now called coordinated effects (FTC 1997).  Today in 
Washington, the unwritten rule is that one needs at least three firms in an antitrust market for 
effective competition, i.e. no coordinated effect problem.  Ivaldi et al. (2003a) describe how U.S. 
and European Union antitrust agencies currently analyze coordinated effects.  High 
concentration, even with high barriers to entry, are necessary but not sufficient to establish tacit 
collusion.  Following Stigler the agencies look for facilitating practices that have no justification 
in a competitive market as evidence of deviation from competitive conduct. 
  In the European Union the original antitrust focus was on what is now called unilateral 
effects.  Recently dominance has been generalized to analyze margins and more generally market 
power in differentiated product markets (Ivaldi et al. 2003b).  As the number of firms (brands) in 
a differentiated product market declines, a firm’s perceived demand curve becomes less elastic 
and the optimal price and price-cost margin increases.  A firm (brand) manager unilaterally 
elevates price thereby creating an antitrust injury without tacit or explicit collusion.  One 
estimates and uses elasticities to demonstrate how a merger between brands that are close 
substitutes leads to elevated prices.   
Note that, unlike the coordinated effects or homogeneous product dominant firm analysis, 
this elasticity based analysis of unilateral market power does not require one to define a product 
or geographic market, compute market shares, and infer merger impact from the level of shares 
and pricing conduct.     6
Returning to the retail supermarket industry, empirical analysis over the past 30 years 
illustrates how much, or how little, we know about coordinated and unilateral effects in local 
antitrust markets and how analysis of market power has evolved.  Marion et al (1979) designed a 
study of the supermarket industry for the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the U.S. Congress 
to evaluate the Demsetz efficiency as well as the market power hypothesis.  The JEC demanded 
and the top 17 supermarket chains provided, subpoena, detailed profit and price data for their 
operations in local markets.  Using local market price-cost margins for individual chains Marion 
et al estimated several concentration-profit models.  They generally found positive and 
significant relationships in several different data sets including one that focused upon the 
profitability of a single firm’s operations (A&P) across many local markets.  Such intra-firm 
studies focus most squarely on local market power and efficiency effects because they abstract 
from interfirm variation in accounting and financial practices, managerial practices, vertical 
integration, private label programs, buying power, store layout, and merchandising practices. 
  To determine whether the higher profits in more concentrated local markets was due to 
market power or efficiency Marion et al. constructed and analyzed local market price indices and 
found a positive and significant relationship between a firm’s price level and concentration.
3  
Moreover both studies specified a firm’s market share position relative to concentration and also 
found profit and prices to be significantly and positively related to firm position.  Higher prices, 
not Demsetz efficiency, was the source of higher profits in more concentrated markets. 
 Since  then  concentration-price studies in several other local market industries report 
similar results.  In response Demsetz and others advanced what has become known as the 
                                                 
3 Many commonly available price indices such as the U.S. Consumer Price Index are not constructed in a fashion 
that measures antitrust price phenomena.  One must measure prices on a fixed set of products, and one must 
aggregate them into weighted price indices that reflect the importance of each product in the representative 
consumers’ grocery basket Geithman and Marion (1993) is an excellent source for understanding price aggregation 
procedures.   7
Demsetz quality critique.  They note that a positive concentration or market share price 
relationship could be due to larger firms having higher quality in a differentiated product 
industry such as food retailing (Anderson 1993).  Cotterill (1986), however, finds a strong intra-
firm share-price relationship for each of two supermarket chains that operated in several local 
markets.  Since “quality” is reasonably uniform across a chain store’s operations in several local 
markets, these share-price correlations are not due to quality.  Cotterill (1999) explicitly modeled 
store characteristics, service levels and prices in a simultaneous equations system to test the 
Demsetz quality and market power hypotheses jointly.  Controlling for quality effects, 
concentration and market share continued to be positively related to price.   
With the advent of New Empirical Industrial Organization NEIO, reduced form analysis 
of market structure profit and price relationships fell out of favor.  The Fisher-McGowan critique 
of accounting measures of profitability-essentially an assertion that one can never use accounting 
profits to measure economic profits – was one of the primary reasons for the advance of 
structural econometric NEIO models of demand and cost conditions to estimate price cost 
margins and are use them as indices of market power.  Also, very few of the concentration-profit 
or concentration-price studies controlled for market structure endogeneity.  Yet Froeb and 
Werden (1991) found that the bias in price studies likely result in an understated concentration-
price relationship.   
As evidenced by 1) the use of a local market, cross-section, intra-firm technique by 
Ashenfelter in FTC v Staples (Baker 1997), 2) the FTC block of Royal Ahold’s acquisition of 
Pathmark (Cotterill 1999), and 3) the UK Competition Commission report (2000), the cross 
section concentration-price method still has traction.  In FTC v. Staples, Ashenfelter found no 
relationship between market share and price at the store level, however, a strong positive   8
relationship exists when the market was defined as a larger urban geographic area.  The U.K. 
Competition Commission curiously tested only store level models.  They report that local market 
structure matters for pricing at Tesco but not Safeway.  Sainsbury the other leading chain 
submitted no store level price data (U.K. Competition Commission, 2000, p. 128). 
In this paper we will classify NEIO research as first or second generation.  First 
generation studies focus upon the following:  homogeneous products aggregated to the national 
level, and a census industry category that is often larger than the relevant antitrust product 
market.  Readily available data, rather than economic theory or the policy issue, typically drive 
this choice.  Such aggregate NEIO analysis requires restrictive assumptions that limit its 
usefulness for antitrust analysis.  To aggregate across firms one must assume a homogeneous 
product and Gorman polar firm level cost functions wherein firms have constant and identical 
marginal costs.  If one relaxes Cournot to estimate a conjectural variation parameter or more 
generally a “market power parameter” to avoid the recent critique of C.V. models (e.g. Kim and 
Knittel) all firms in these aggregate homogeneous product models in equilibrium have the same 
C.V. parameter value.  The constant cost and C.V. power parameter constrain market shares to 
equal values.  In fact in most industries market shares are not equal.   
Some C.V. models estimate a conjectural elasticity parameter.  Then in equilibrium the 
product of a firm’s market share and its C.V. parameter are equal across firms.  This means that a 
large share firm must have a lower C.V., an unattractive constraint.   
Often NEIO studies must make other assumptions to accommodate aggregate data.  For 
example in an analysis of market power in the Australian retail meat sector Hyde and Perloff 
assume that Sydney retail and wholesale meat prices measure national prices to analyze national 
meat disappearance data.  For a study of retail market power one would have a more relevant   9
study if they had found quantity data for Sidney, and analyzed market power in that antitrust 
market.   
  Recent “second generation” NEIO research goes beyond homogenous product markets 
and aggregate industry level estimation to analyze individual firm and brand level pricing 
conduct in differentiated product markets.  Firm and brand level scanner data for food products 
permits estimating a brand level price elasticity matrix.  To date most studies focus upon only 
unilateral effects by using an estimated demand system to recover price cost margins and 
simulate a merger impact assuming Nash-Bertrand competition.  Early examples that focus on 
market power at the manufacturer level are Hausman et al. (1994) for beer and Cotterill (1994) 
for breakfast cereal.  These two studies and many subsequent brand level studies use panel data 
features to specify retail prices in other cities as instruments for endogenous retail prices.
4  If one 
specifies the cost side, i.e. uses classical exogenous cost shift variables to identify the demand 
system, then one can measure coordinated as well as unilateral power effects (e.g. Cotterill and 
Samson 2002).  In addition to recovering price cost margins, one can test for alternative pricing 
games, including Nash Bertrand or Stackelberg conduct.   
  Two second generation NEIO studies have addressed supermarket pricing power.  
Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar (2000) analyze the demand for aggregate national brand and private 
label products across 125 food categories and 59 local market.  To pool and compare prices 
across categories they use a logarithmic first difference model.  This measures percent change in 
price, quantity and other variables.  On the supply side they estimate reaction functions to 
analyze pricing interaction between branded and private label product.  Four-firm grocery 
concentration is specified in both reaction functions to test for higher price levels in more 
concentrated local retail markets.  They report a positive and significant (5%) relationship 
                                                 
4 For a critique of this approach see Bresnahan (1997).   10
between the percent change in branded price and the change in grocery concentration between 
1991 and 1992.  For private label price the relationship is positive and significant at the one 
percent level.  Moreover the coefficient in the PL equation is twice the coefficient in the NB 
equation.  Supermarket retailers in more concentrated markets use their market position to 
increase profits from the sale of private label.  This result is consistent with leading supermarket 
chains using PL to bargain for lower wholesale NB prices and thus optimizing profits in the 
category by increasing brands prices less than private label. 
  Another second generation NEIO study focuses upon supermarket retail price 
determination in a very advanced fashion.  Smith (2000) adapts the discrete choice demand 
model to analyze spatial unilateral pricing power at the store level by supermarket chains.  Smith 
combines data on known firm price-cost margins for the total UK with two other data sets, one 
on store characteristics for each supermarket in the study and the other on the food shopping 
behavior of 115,000 consumers in the study area.  He estimates the equilibrium price for each 
store as well as own and cross price elasticities at the store level.  Smith finds that demerger in 
local markets (splitting up multi-store holdings of a chain in local markets) reduces prices 
between 2 and 3.8% in the UK markets that he investigates.  Mergers between various pairs of 
firms increase prices as much as 7%. 
  Note that this study rejects the Fisher McGowan critique and uses accounting profits to 
estimate prices.
5  The use of aggregate (at the national UK level) accounting-based price-cost 
margins to estimate pricing in individual supermarkets, however, is a far reach.  His analysis 
would benefit from access to disaggregate local firm-in-market level accounting price-cost 
margins.  Smith’s resurrection of accounting price cost margins, however, suggests that 
                                                 
5 Nevo (2000) and Hausman et al. (1997) also use accounting price cost margins, but in a different fashion.   11
examination of price cost margins at the store, firm and market level and their relationship to 
market structure is useful if carefully done.   
  Turning now to merger enforcement policy in the U.S., in practice there are two prongs to 
retail merger analysis.  The first prong follows the merger guidelines.  One identifies the relevant 
market, computes HHI pre and post merger, examines competitive effects, barrier to entry, and 
efficiencies, and weighs the pro and cons.  The other prong is consistent with Smith, but much 
simpler.  One examines business documents such as customer draw studies to define supermarket 
trade areas.  One identifies adjacent stores that are close substitutes.  If there are not too many the 
FTC may pursue a “fix it first” strategy.  They obtain divestiture of the overlapping stores to 
other third firms to preserve competition in that area of the market.  For example, using this 
method the FTC and New England Attorney Generals obtained the divestiture of 31 
supermarkets from the Royal Ahold-Stop and Shop merger in New England (Cotterill, 1999).  
Recent studies by the FTC and others, however, have concluded that this “fix it first” approach is 
fraught with difficulty.  Divested chain stores often don’t do well under third party ownership 
(Parker and Balto, 2000).  Third party buyers that can sustain or expand a divested store simply 
do not exist in many markets. 
Vertical Market Power 
  The sequence of markets and industries between farmers and consumers, also has 
important implications for performance.  As in the horizontal dimension the two primary 
dimensions of performance are efficiency and market power.  Here, we retreat from the new 
Institutional Economics of contracts and focus squarely on open market pricing in a channel that 
has oligopostic manufacturing and retailing industries.     12
IIIa.  Vertical Pricing Games 
Vertical pricing strategies can take several different forms.  The simplest vertical models 
are those that specify fixed or proportional markup conduct by manufacturers and retailers.  One 
can formally specify and test for these non-strategic “rules of thumb” pricing rules within the 
context of vertical pricing games.   
Choi (1981) gives the theory for three alternative vertical games for retailers and 
manufacturers.  Under vertical Nash pricing manufacturers maximize profits assuming retail 
price changes by the same amount as the wholesale price.  This 100% price transmission allows 
manufacturers to identify wholesale demand from observed retail demand.  Under vertical Nash 
retailers maximize profits assuming that changes in retail prices have no impact on wholesale 
prices.   
In a manufacturer Stackelberg model, retailers play vertical Nash but manufacturers 
know the retailers reaction function to wholesale prices and use it to set price when maximizing 
profit.  In a retailer Stakkelberg game the converse holds.  Retailers know and use manufacturer 
reaction functions, while manufacturers continue to play vertical Nash. 
  Cotterill and Putsis (2001) test for proportional retail markup, vertical Nash, or 
manufacturer Stakkelberg conduct for national brand and private label products in each of six 
categories across 59 local markets for 1991 and 1992.  They generally reject proportional 
markup behavior by retailers and find that vertical Nash conduct is more common than 
manufacturer Stackelberg for private label than branded products.  This is consistent with the 
general understanding that brand manufacturers have more knowledge about retailers and more 
pricing power than private label manufacturers.  Froeb et al. explain that the FTC now rejects 
fixed and proportional retail markup models.  They declare:  “retailers do not play the passive   13
role … i.e. simply marking up the wholesale price of goods to cover their costs” (Froeb et al., 
2004, p. 368). 
IIIb.  Private Label Pricing Strategy:  Competitive Retailers 
  Private label products are a prominent feature of nearly all industrialized food systems 
including Australia.  Moreover they are not a new or recent innovation.  In the 1960’s the U.S. 
National Food Commission completed an extensive study of private label activity (NCFM).  At 
that time private label was seen as a vertical integration strategy by large chains with little 
buying power in the wholesale market.  Chains faced “brand monopolists” in the manufacturing 
sector.  To thwart their pricing power the supermarkets integrated into the processing of products 
such as milk and bread, and contract integrated into areas such as canned and packaged grocery 
items.  The result was more consumer choice, lower prices, and a more competitive food 
manufacturing industry (NCFM). 
IIIc.  Countervailing or Coalescing Power 
  With his countervailing power hypotheses J. K. Galbraith posed a different solution to 
manufacturer power.  He argued that the solution to power on one side of the market was to 
develop power to develop on the other side.  The obvious examples of his time were labor unions 
that sought to countervail powerful large corporate employers, and agricultural bargaining 
cooperatives.  In the resulting bilateral monopoly situation price and other terms of trade are 
indeterminant but for bargaining.  Walter Adams and others, however, argued that concentration 
on both sides of a market would produce coalescing power, i.e. the adversaries would combine to 
affectively increase the exercise of power against others in markets up or down the market 
channel.     14
Dobson and Waterson analyze these two competing hypotheses for the U.K. supermarket 
industry.  Their theoretical analysis begins with the premise that manufacturers and supermarkets 
are locked in a bilateral monopoly situation in the wholesale market, i.e. countervailing power 
exists.  They demonstrate that coalescing power is the outcome and consumers pay higher prices 
when supermarkets also have market power in the retail market (Dobson and Waterson, 1997 p. 
428).  Dobson and Waterson did not analyze the symmetric issue for the raw product market, 
however if manufacturers have buyer power there one would expect a symmetric result.  
Coalescing power between retailers and manufacturers would lower raw product prices to 
farmers. 
IIId.  Vertical Market Foreclosure and Price Leadership 
  There also is an important dynamic dimension to the exercise of market power in a 
vertical channel by retailers and manufacturers.  The growth of supermarket chains to market 
dominance can reinforce anti-competitive conduct in the retail market via strategic moves in the 
vertical dimension.  For example in Toys R Us v. FTC, 221F3d 928 (7
th Circuit, 2000) the court 
found that this leading toy retailer was able to require toy manufacturers to offer less favorable 
terms of trade to other toy retailers, thereby hurting its rivals and reinforcing its market power at 
retail.   
  Consider a second vertical strategic game that may be more pernicious because it shares 
power gains with rival firms in the channel, and thus may more likely escape detection and 
persistently damage consumers.  A dominant retail firm can extract cost concessions from a food 
processor that effectively force a dominant processor to charge other retailers higher wholesale 
prices.  Yet now rather than use its cost advantage to start a price war at retail to damage 
competitors, the advantaged dominant retailer elevates prices so that competitors, whose costs   15
are higher, make more not less profits than before.  The dominant firm’s price leadership 
scheme, also increases its own profits and the profits of the processor profits (from higher priced 
sale to the retail fringe firms).  The result is coalescing power against consumers.  
  This situation has existed in the New England fluid milk market since 2000 (Cotterill 
2003 et al.)  Royal Ahold via its Stop and Shop supermarket chain has had a dominant market 
share at retail (50%) due primarily to horizontal mergers during the 1990’s.  In 2000 it closed its 
milk plant and negotiated a 20 year strategic alliance with the Dean Foods milk processing 
company that thereafter supplied over 80% of New England supermarket milk.   
In 2003 Stop and Shop paid the raw market price plus 53 cents per gallon for milk 
delivered into its stores.  Competing supermarket chains pay 10 cents per gallon more for the 
same supply.  Stop and Shop has led prices up so that retail margins over the past five years are 
$1.50 per gallon.  In store marginal costs are 20-25 cents per gallon and fully allocated costs are 
40-50 cents per gallon.  Therefore all supermarket chains are capturing approximately $1 per 
gallon as a power premium and the processor earns a share as well.  This vertical collusion game 
escapes Robinson-Patman prosecution in the U.S. because the cost discount granted to the 
powerful buyer does not damage other retailers.   
Although not perfectly verified many market observers believe this coalescing power was 
also used against farmers.  Big Y, a large regional supermarket chain that initially opted to 
receive its milk from the number three fluid processor recently threatened to switch to the 
dominant processor if it could not pay a lower wholesale price.  The demand was so substantial 
that the processor went to its farmer cooperative supplier and demanded a lower raw milk price, 
otherwise it claimed it would lose the retail account and go out of business.  Agri-Mark, the 
threatened regional co-op with annual sales of over $500 million and over 1,400 members could   16
not sell to Dean Foods because a competing national cooperative has a nationwide full supply 
contract with that dominant processor.  To keep their fluid market, in this situation, farmers in 
the regional cooperative cut price.  This is positive proof that when it comes to the exercise of 
buyer power against farmers, the truth is often found in analysis of the institutional details in 
relevant antitrust markets rather than aggregate national analysis. 
IIIe.  Double Marginalization 
  Market concentration and coalescing power between food manufacturers and retailers can 
go too far for their own good.  A market channel with two successive monopolists that seek to 
maximize profits suffers double marginalization.  This is the case no matter which vertical 
pricing game they play.  The move from two (or more) monopolies in a market channel to one 
monopoly lowers retail and wholesale prices, increase output, and increases total channel profit.
6 
  In many countries consolidation at retail and in the processing industries has, in fact gone 
so far that the operative question is how can firms in the channel eliminate double or even triple 
marginalization?  The latter can arise when one has farmer cooperatives, marketing boards, or 
agricultural policies that elevate prices as well as powerful manufacturers and retailers.   
  Focusing on the wholesale market, vertical integration eliminates double 
marginalization.  However, a supermarket chain can’t buy all of its suppliers nor can a 
monopolist in a particular manufacturing industry buy all supermarket chains. 
  There are two ways that double marginalization can be reduced.  One benefits retailers 
and the other can benefit retailers and/or manufacturers.  The first is private label.  Mills (1995) 
specifies an address utility model with manufacturer Stakkelberg vertical conduct to demonstrate 
that introduction of a private label product by the retailer eliminates double marginalization.  
Consumers benefit through lower prices and the retailer captures all of the increase in profits.  
                                                 
6 See Cotterill 2000 for a recent analysis in the context of food industries.   17
The Mills model’s basic predictions are consistent with observed market phenomena including 
the following:  retail gross margins are higher on private label than branded products,
7 the 
relative price difference between brands and private label varies directly with brand advertising 
intensities and inversely with private label market share, own price elasticities of demand for 
brands vary inversely with private label market share, and private label share falls if a cost 
component such as raw product cost, that is common to both increases (Mills, 1995, p. 513). 
  A second way to eliminate double marginalization in a fashion that can benefit 
manufacturers as well as retailers is any “supply chain management” policy that allows a 
manufacturer and retailer to jointly set the wholesale and retail prices.  Trade promotions do this, 
slotting allowances do not.  Thus the rise of double marginalization issues in the vertical market 
channel predicts that trade promotions will increase in importance rather than disappear.  Rather 
than cause excess inventory problems, trade promotions solve the problem.
8  Cotterill (2000b) 
provides an analysis of trade promotions that eliminate double marginalization.   
IIIf.  The Exercise of Buyer Power Against Farmers   
  Concentrated retailers and food manufacturers may also be able to increase profits by 
lowering prices paid to farmers if farmers are unorganized, have no alternative markets, are 
susceptible to price discrimination, or have no marketing board or agricultural price policy to 
countervail buyer power.  The New England fluid milk industry example illustrates this point.   
  In theory, empirical measurement of buyer power in a food marketing channel is not 
perfectly symmetric to the analysis of seller power.  First consider market definition.  Product 
market definition at retail, e.g. ready to eat cereal that uses corn, wheat, or rice, can be very 
                                                 
7 Curiously, the UK Competition Commission study did not find this (UKCE, p. 2). 
8Supply chain management is often regarded as a logistics exercise.  In fact logistic analysis suggests substantial 
cost savings if retailers would eschew hi-lo retailing with its reliance on trade promotions and move to every day 
low prices (EDLP).   18
different from product market definition in the raw market, e.g. the sale of corn.  When defining 
markets one must consider sales to the away-from-home market (restaurants and institutions) and 
possibly export.  In theory retailer and manufacturer buying conduct may be tempered by these 
options for sellers.  In practice one needs to carefully investigate these contingencies and look for 
price discrimination by buyers that segments what otherwise would appear to be a global market 
for a commodity. 
  Carstensen (2004) finds that large and dominant buyers have even more incentive than 
similar sized firms on the selling side of a market to exert both unilateral and coordinated market 
power.  Unilaterally lowered input pay prices benefit the firm by reinforcing the ability to profit 
or capture new customers.  Cheating on a coordinated effort to lower input prices, i.e. paying a 
higher price for raw materials, does not have the output enhancing effect that a cheater in a 
seller’s cartel obtains from a price cut.  This fact also translates into stronger incentives for a 
buyer’s cartel in auction markets and contracting schemes in other markets that shift risks onto 
farmers and lowers raw product prices. 
IV.  Price Transmission in an Imperfectly Competitive Market Channel 
  When farm prices drop and retail prices don’t policy concerns about non-competitive 
food marketing channels surface in agricultural and antitrust policy areas.  For example, this is a 
major concern of dairy farmers in the U.S. (Cotterill et. al. 2003) and in Australia.  In the United 
Kingdom one of the main reasons for the Competition Commission study of supermarket 
retailing was “a public perception of … an apparent disparity between farm and retail prices … 
which is seen as evidence by some that grocer multiples were profiting from the crisis in the 
farming industry (Competition Commission, 2000, p. 3).   19
  In his classic article Gardiner (1975) developed a model for a competitive market 
channel.  Gardner demonstrated that even if farm production and the marketing industry are 
perfectly competitive and if constant returns to scale exists in marketing, there is not a unique 
and stable relationship between farm and retail prices.  In other words there is no sound 
economic reason to expect that retail prices should be related to farm prices.  One response to 
Gardiner was a concerted effort by empirically oriented economists to ascertain under what more 
restrictive conditions one could estimate the relationship between farm and retail prices and be 
confident that the empirical result captured economic behavior. 
  The most common approach is Hein’s (1980) model.  Hein assumes perfect competition, 
constant returns to scale, and fixed proportion production technology in the marketing industry.  
He also assumes a perfectly elastic supply of nonfarm inputs to the marketing industry, 
unidirectional shocks to the system that emanate from shifts in the farm supply curve, and static 
equilibrium. 
Under these conditions Heins constructs a fixed-markup model (Hein, p. 11 p. 14) where 
the coefficients on the raw agricultural product price and other input prices are the Leontieff 
production function coefficients.  Since the model has a fixed markup, the price transmission rate 
depends only on the Leontieff production coefficient for the agricultural input.  If it takes one 
unit (.5 units) of raw product to produce a unit of finished product, e.g. milk, then the price 
transmission rate is 100% (50%). 
McCorriston and coauthors were among the first to present a model of price transmission 
with a noncompetitive market sector (McCorriston, 2002).  They specify two successive market 
channel industries, manufacturing and retailing, however they continue to assume homogeneous 
product in a NEIO quantity CV model.  With linear demand and constant marginal costs, double   20
marginalization in this type of model produces a 50 percent transmission rate for each 
monopolist and a 25% channel transmission rate.  Logarithmic demand with constant own price 
elasticity in conjunction with constant marginal costs always produces price transmission rates in 
excess of 100%.   
Cotterill (1998) uses Bertrand oligopoly models to analyze price transmission in a 
differentiated product market.  Price rather than quantity is the strategic choice variable.  In these 
models a second order derivative, the derivative of the own price elasticity, determines whether 
price transmission in an oligopoly is less or greater than 100%.  Cotterill also finds that price 
transmission is always greater than 100% in noncompetitive markets where a firm chooses to 
maximize brand sales given a desired target level of profits, including a loss leader strategy. 
Two important conclusions follow.  First, for policy analysis if one assumes perfect 
competition all benefits of agricultural policy deregulation flow to consumers when in fact a 
significant portion may remain with non-competitive channel firms.  Second, one must use a 
more flexible demand system to measure market power and price transmission than the linear, 
logarithmic, or semi-log demand specification that is used in many NEIO models.  Using an 
LA/AIDs model and estimation results for the carbonated soft drink industry Cotterill (1998, p. 
12) shows that cost pass thru rates range from 73% for Royal Crown cola to 107% for Coca Cola 
and 110% for private label.  Kim (2004) specifies and estimates a discrete choice demand model 
for brands of American cheese in the U.S.  He reports price transmission rates as low as 30%.   
Another functional form that nicely fits price transmission analysis is the generalized 
Box-Cox demand model.  One can estimate the Box-Cox transformation parameter, λ , and 
different values give different functional forms ranging from linear (50% CRTR) to semi-
logarithmic (100% CRTR) to log-log (greater than 100%).  Bettendorf and Verboven (2000)   21
specify a model with a Box-Cox demand form, however they were not able to estimate λ .  
Instead they fix it at the linear, quadratic, and full logarithmic demand form values, estimate and 
compare results.  Moreover their results are not at the brand or firm level in an industry that is 
clearly differentiated.  They use a Cournot homogenous product model at the market level to 
analyze price transmission in the Dutch coffee industry because only aggregate data are 
available. 
V.  Implications for Research 
Clearly the most important conclusion from this review of market power in the 
supermarket industry is the need for disaggregate analysis at the relevant product and geographic 
market level.  Econometric studies are certainly desirable; however, case studies of firm conduct 
in relevant antitrust markets also provide credible evidence.  If products are differentiated this 
feature should also be incorporated into either type of study rather than assume homogenous 
products.  As one moves upstream from retailers towards farmers the relevant market may 
become broader and more homogenous; however, one must carefully examine the opportunities 
for buyer based price discrimination in what would otherwise appear to be a broad homogenous 
product market, even a global market.   
The Fisher McGowan critique of accounting profits has always been questionable.  After 
all if accounting profits say nothing about economic profits then the world’s capital markets are a 
fantasy and capitalist economies are rudderless.  Recently three leading NEIO studies have used 
accounting price cost margins.  Although out of fashion for 25 years, careful analysis of PCM’s 
at the brand, or firm, as well as the market level can provide insight on market power, quality 
and efficiency questions.  Reduced form models that analyze price levels in local market 
industries such as supermarket retailing have never gone out of style; however, relatively little   22
research has been done in this area over the past ten years.  The collection of price data and 
aggregation into an appropriate price index for antitrust analysis is a very large scale endeavor.  
This retards research in the area. 
Price transmission in non competitive market channels needs considerably more research.  
One way to proceed would be to compute the price transmission rates that are implicit in NEIO 
studies that estimate price cost margins as power indices.  It would be interesting to reveal the 
constraints on price transmission in these models.  Any future NEIO models should be 
sufficiently flexible to allow for price transmission above or below 100%.  Another issue that has 
received virtually no attention is price transmission from retailers back to farmers.  It is 
important when buyer power is a concern. 
Research needs to identify and examine the vertical pricing games being played and 
evaluate the impact on manufacturer as well as retail margins (Chidmi et al. 2005).  Most of the 
business-oriented literature on vertical strategic alliances and value chain management focuses 
only on efficiency and ignores market power.  As argued here vertical pricing practices such as 
trade promotions, inherently inefficient in a logistics world, may enhance allocative efficiency by 
reducing double marginalization.  Other vertical conduct can reinforce anticompetitive conduct 
in the horizontal dimension, and hurt farmers and/or consumers.   
Food marketing is a very diverse and complex process.  Advances in theory, and 
empirical methods give us ample methods.  Now all we need is the data, and it does exist!   23
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